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I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE CONTEXT OF COMPROMISE
A. "Location, Location, Location"
B. "Timing Is Everything"
C. "The Process Really Matters "-Principled, Problem-
Solving, or Something Else?
III. VARIATIONS IN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMPROMISES
I. INTRODUCTION
Certain issues have a way of coming up again and again in human
history, often affected by the times in which the issues are nested.
Compromise is, once again, on the minds of scholars,' journalists, ethicists,2
* Chancellor's Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law and A.B.
Chettle, Jr. Professor of Law, Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. In waves spanning decades we can see resurgences of scholars seeking to grapple with the
philosophy, sociology and ethics of different treatments of compromise. See, e.g., MARTIN
BENJAMIN, SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: COMPROMISE AND INTEGRITY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS
(1990); AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES (2010); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Ethics of Compromise, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 155 (Christopher
Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2006) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The Ethics of
Compromise]; NOMOS: COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICS (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1979); Compromis/Compromise, 43 INFORMATION SUR LES SCIENCES SOCIALES
131-305 (2004).
2. This year the annual Bio-Medical Ethics seminar hosted at the National Institutes of Health,
903
and political actors at both national and international levels, as we seek to
deal with difficult issues of international relations, war and peace,
diplomatic negotiations, and our particular forms of American democracy
with divided governments, separation of powers, three (or four, if our
administrative agencies are recognized as almost "separate" branches)
branches of government, and polarized two party systems. Philosophers,
political theorists, legal scholars, and others often think of compromise as a
"second best" to the preferred ideal of commitments to "principles,"
"rights," "justice," or "truth" which all seem so much more clean, clear,
"moral," or justified. Compromise often seems a poor, if human, decision to
"settle" for less than our very best.
I have been asked to comment on some of this recent rethinking of the
concept of compromise, here in light of institutional issues of compromise in
American constitutionalism, in part, because of my prior "defenses" or
"justifications" of compromise, as a negotiation scholar who sees that
sometimes, not always, compromise may itself be a moral good, justified
because of the outcomes it permits (peace, some forms of justice and desert)
and the process itself which recognizes the claims of "another side" and
takes them seriously.3
Like several other scholars,4 Professor Sanford Levinson has, in his
Brandeis lecture at Pepperdine University School of Law, sought to explore
the nature of compromise in our own constitutional order. He has examined
several stages and aspects of our constitutional order-its constitutive
bargaining process in the founding of our polity, which included, among
many others, the compromises of the continued existence of slavery (and the
concomitant measure of 3/5 of a man counted in the Constitution) and the
counter-democratic representation principles of the Senate. Discussed
further are the on-going institutionalized compromises in the functioning of
the different parts of our constitutional government, and, in particular, the
actions of the interpreters of the Constitution-Supreme Court justices who
may compromise their own principles in their voting and opinion writing
practices. By focusing on one great non-compromising justice, Justice
Bio-medical ethics program, was devoted to compromise. I was a speaker in the series on December
14,2010.
3. Menkel-Meadow, The Ethics of Compromise, supra note 1; WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR
NEGOTIATORS (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Compromise, Negotiation, and Morality, 26 NEGOTIATION J. 483 (2010) [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, Compromise, Negotiation, and Morality]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J.
2663 (1995).
4. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
(2002); MARGALIT, supra note 1, at 54-61; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); Dana Lansky, Proceeding to a Constitution: A
Multi-Party Negotiation Analysis of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv.
279 (2000); Jack Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests and Politics of Constitution
Making, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 424 (1987).
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Brandeis (both in his general approaches to the law and in his notable dissent
writing), Professor Levinson explores and exposes questions in
consideration of constitutional compromises (both processual and outcomes
reached), which have been raised by many others who study compromise in
a deeper philosophical context or others who have recently studied the
function of principled dissent in transforming our understandings of how law
is made, articulated, transformed and justified in our constitutional order.5
When should judges or other public officials "go along" with a negotiated
outcome and when should they veto, dissent or otherwise "block" a
governmental action or choice based on "principle?"
In this brief commentary I want to reiterate claims I have made in other
contexts, but which are also true, alas, in our constitutional order, that
compromise is sometimes a moral good in itself. Even more wistfully, I
assert here, we will never be able to judge compromises or that seemingly
greater good-"principled" decisions-by a universal standard. All
compromises, whether of great constitutional, diplomatic, political, or
"lesser" personal or commercial moment, must be judged by the greater
context in which they are situated. All compromises have temporal, social,
and political, effects. What seems principled or expedient or an exigent
circumstance in any one moment may look different at later times, or to
other decision makers. So, I suggest here, that compromise is itself a moral
concept, requiring us to examine it and evaluate it in variable or "relative,"
not deracinated or "universal," circumstances.
Compromises, as Professor Levinson realizes, come at different times
(constitutive moments of institutional design or "founding" that may differ
greatly from moments of other legal or political decision making when
implementing or interpreting choices that must be practically made). And
compromises may be differentially evaluated depending on who is enacting
them (the actors) and where (in which institutional and historical settings).
Compromise cannot be universalized-it must be studied in its variable
forms and enactments. Professor Levinson's examination of some
"constitutional compromises" illustrates how rich, complex, and ultimately
irresolvable some of these assessments are. I hope Professor Levinson's
essay (and this commentary) encourage more detailed examination of these
issues in a wide variety of legal and political settings.
905
5. See, e.g., I DISSENT: GREAT OPPOSING OPINIONS IN LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES
(Mark Tushnet ed., 2008).
II. THE CONTEXT OF COMPROMISE
A. "Location, Location, Location"
To use a popular California (real estate) idea, one might say that the
moral justification of compromise depends a great deal on "location,
location, location." Constitutive bargaining, when constitutions and
governments or organizations are formed (and commitments are made for
future generations), may be quite different from assessing the actions of
institutions or individuals in their practical day-to-day and iterative function.
To use the recent analysis of social and political philosopher Avishai
Margalit, "rotten" compromises are those that "establish or maintain an
inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty and humiliation .... Thus, the
negotiations (and compromise) which allowed slavery to continue for a
future generation in American constitutional processes were immoral
compromises (as many of the founders agreed at the time7) on these terms
because they continued an inhumane and cruel regime, which affected those
who were not themselves part of the negotiating and compromising.
Compromises should be assessed, in part, by where they occur (the
institutional setting), whether binding on more than those who do the
compromising themselves, or more mundanely, where there is the possibility
to renegotiate over time (courts in common law settings, legislatures that can
"redo" their legislative actions, or more commonly in repeat player
situations of local, community government, workplaces or families and
relationships). Perhaps this element of "constitutive" compromises makes
compromises at the time of formation of institutions different than those of
more ongoing, iterative or contingent decision-making.
B. "Timing Is Everything"
Whether the intrinsic "rottenness" of this bad (slavery) compromise was
"justified" or morally (or politically) permissible because it allowed the
"union" (not so perfect) to be formed must be measured not only at the time
of its initial achievement, but temporally later, as we measure whether the
union was able to exist or flourish because this compromise was effectuated.
Most discussions of the compromise on slavery in modern times condemn
the choice morally, but insist on its necessity politically-to hold the nascent
and highly conflictual union together. On this issue, of whether the
compromise on slavery really achieved its goals, reasonable minds may
6. MARGALIT, supra note 1, at 1-2.
7. See ELLIS, supra note 4; PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE
CONsTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 32-37 (2010); JACK RACKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY
OF THE INVENTION OF AMERICA (2010).
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certainly differ. As many scholars are now revisiting the Constitutional
Convention as a site to study and to apply negotiation theory (examined
through the modem lens of "multi-party negotiation theory"8 or system
design9), one might profitably do a retrospective political, economic, social,
and human analysis of whether the union which existed (and then was
rended apart at the great cost of the lives lost in the Civil War) at the time of
framing really was "worth it" or, at least, was "better than" (in relative
terms) whatever other political solutions might have been achieved (No
slavery, two countries? Many little ones? Back to England?) if the
compromise had not been reached at all.
And compromises or adjustments made in constitutional formation
(which are likely to be "one-shot" or "one off," even if they take quite
awhile to be concluded and ratified) are quite different from compromises
that might be reached in more iterative environments, such as when judges,
even on the rights-based Supreme Court interact with each other more often.
Trade-offs, even about principled items, can be "rationalized" and indeed
can lead to important democratization of process and equalization of
outcomes if trades are monitored, subject to accountability, and shared.
Thus, "one-off' constitutional compromises (such as slavery and the
Senateo) must be judged and measured differently than those which allow
for repetition, correction, accountability, and reciprocity norms, as in other
political processes (such as are more common in at least some legislative
processes).
C. "The Process Really Matters "-Principled, Problem-Solving, or
Something Else?
In what is, for me, the most interesting and provocative treatment of the
negotiation processes which affect constitutive processes, Jon Elster has
compared the "first best" principled French constitutional formation process
with that of the "second best" American compromising founding processes
and found the latter to have been, ultimately, more "robust" than the former,
precisely because of "second best" compromises and less than ideal
processes." Elster suggests that where the French committed themselves to
8. See Lansky, supra note 4.
9. Symposium, Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute Resolution:
Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV, NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2009).
10. It should be noted that both of these "one-off" negotiations still produced significant ongoing
negotiations and rule changes in subsequent amendments, etc., e.g. elimination of slavery and direct
election of the Senate.
11. Jon Elster, The Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLuTION 236
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public, plenary, and principled processes in constitutional formation,
negotiations became brittle, rigid, and difficult to maneuver around. With
the equivalent of modem press conferences, public statements of principles
and disagreements led to transfers of power (and murders) of those whom
the revolutionary majorities disfavored. In contrast, the American
constitutional process was more or less confidential (until its results were
announced at the end), and was accomplished in committee (not plenary)
sessions, which allowed for more detailed working out of issues and then
trades (or log-rolling) between committees. This, in the end, allowed a great
variety of compromises to bring in, through trading, those who got some, but
not all, of what they wanted. The American Constitution thus (albeit with its
many amendments and a punishing civil war) has lasted far longer than the
many French constitutional orders. 12
Compromises, then, might be assessed by their practical temporal
robustness, as well as by their formative principles. If the purposes of
constitutionalism (the creation of structures of government with
commitments for a longer term) are to create a political order, then perhaps
at least one "relative" measure of the success of that constitutionalism is its
longevity or ability to adapt and use additional forms of compromise
(interpretation, new amendments, new institutional orders"3 ) in order to
continue to exist.
At the same time, while many would persist in the claim (Levinson,
Margalit, and many other legal and political scholars are among those, I
think) that constitutive bargaining and moments of institutional design might
require more "principled" thinking (and doing), just because constitutional
commitments are those which are intended to go forward with effects for
many generations and thus bind more than the compromisers themselves,
other "locations" or sites of political action which are more "ordinary" might
permit more "expedient" compromises.
Professor Levinson does an able job of reviewing the elements of the
thinking processes of interpreters of the Constitution (justices on the
Supreme Court) who must decide whether it is appropriate or desirable to go
along with a vote in one case, with the hope of being able to "call in a chit"
later (judicial log-rolling), or whether to go public, in a principled way, with
a dissent that may have either positive (changing the law in that direction
later) or negative (alienating further possible judicial allies) effects. His
realpolitik approach to judicial voting and decision making reminds me of
(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
12. 1 have explored the consequences of these different constitution-making processes in Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2004-2005)
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s)] and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and
Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes ofLegal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553 (2006).
13. For example, Bruce Ackerman's "constitutional moments." BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993).
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an event over twenty years ago when the California Judicial Education
Association (or some such entity) asked me to speak on the skills of
negotiation or "Getting to Yes"l 4 in appellate decision making so that judges
could openly examine their negotiation behaviors and skills while working
together to decide cases and craft decisions. I believed that this was truly
avant-garde at the time-judges explicitly looking at their own decision-
making, deliberative, and opinion writing processes through the lens of
"principled and problem-solving" negotiation (as I taught it then). Judges
understood what all legislators already knew-all political decision making
is filled with negotiation, whether called "principled persuasion" or "creative
problem solving" (or in its more sinister form-Machiavellian
"machinations" (more on Machiavelli in a moment)).
Negotiation and compromise does occur in all political decision
making-legislators quite explicitly trade votes or "log-roll" and these days
it is clear that the political parties and the different branches of government
will likely get nowhere unless they explicitly engage in negotiated processes.
President Obama gave up the "public option" in order to enact his health
care plan.]5 Recently, President Obama also agreed to continue expiring tax
cuts in order to obtain extended unemployment benefits and ratification of a
controversial treaty with Russia on strategic arms reduction. While many of
us might prefer "principled" votes and decisions in our polity, it is widely
known, and a shared value, I believe, that legislatures would get nowhere
without trades, log-rolling, and compromises with each other as legislators,
and with other parts of the government (whether the President or his
designates in other executive departments).
At the level of international diplomacy, it is widely accepted that
negotiation and compromise will often be a necessity. Avishai Margalit's
recent book, along with Robert Mnookin's similar undertaking,16 seeks to
explore the dimensions and limits of negotiating and compromising in
different circumstances. While I focus here on location or "site" of
compromises, Margalit focuses on the particular actors-when should we
not compromise with someone we know to be evil? Were the many
founding fathers, who were also slaveholders, "evil" in Margalit's (or
Levinson's) calculus? Should principled death penalty abolitionists on the
14. RODGER FISHER, BRUCE PATrON & WILLIAM L. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1991).
15. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Scaling up Deliberative Democracy in Health Care: A Work in
Progress, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2011).
16. ROBERT MNOOKIN, BARGAINING WITH THE DEVIL: WHEN TO NEGOTIATE, WHEN TO FIGHT
(2010); see also FREDRIK STANTON, GREAT NEGOTIATIONS: AGREEMENTS THAT CHANGED THE
MODERN WORLD (2010).
909
bench never "compromise" with pro-death penalty judges on that issue (or
other issues)? Is one's negotiation partner's "evilness" to be determined on
an issue-by-issue basis or more generally and completely as that person's
total character or gestalt?
III. VARIATIONS IN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMPROMISES
:While often the symbol of principle-less strategic behavior, Niccolo
Machiavelli actually supplies moral justification for the kind of
compromises in which "princes" or other public officials (including judges,
presidents, legislators, and diplomats) must engage to lead their polities.
Machiavelli wrote to guide those who must lead principalities or states (or
create new ones, in constitutional, or other forms of government):
You must realize this: that a prince, and especially a new prince,
cannot observe all those things which give men a reputation for
virtue, because in order to maintain his state he is often forced to act
in defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of religion. And
so he should have a flexible disposition, varying as fortune and
circumstances dictate. As I said above, he should not deviate from
what is good, if that is possible, but he should know how to do evil,
if that is necessary.
... [T]he Prince should. . . determine to avoid anything which will
make him hated and despised.
I also believe that the one who adapts his policy to the times
prospers, and likewise that the one whose policy clashes with the
demands of the times does not.' 7
Machiavelli suggests that Princes (leaders) cannot always be totally
virtuous themselves if they are to lead others (of different views, values, and
religions). Rather, being flexible and sensitive to the policies required "of
the times" may be essential for preserving the Prince's "rule" or, in
Machiavelli's terms, the longevity of the State. Thus, while we may decry
the strategic advice to "bend with the times" or to not be totally virtuous all
of the time, Machiavelli is known for reminding us that the virtue of
"political science" (in the sense of studying and doing political leadership) is
that it must have a "virtue" or ethics that may be different from individual or
personal "principles." The "principles" of government are different from the
principles of individuals (and of groups as well, as modem multi-party
negotiation theory tells us 18). Perhaps this is, in part, what worried Justice
17. NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 101-02, 131 (George Bull trans. & ed., 1961).
18. See, e.g., HowARD RAIFFA WITH JOHN RICHARDSON & DAVID METCALFE, NEGOTIATION
910
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Stanley Reed in Brown v. Board ofEducation.1 9 He knew the United States
Supreme Court, as a political institution, needed to speak as "one," not as a
divided group, but he also wanted to affect the process by which the whole
polity could be brought to come around to compliance with a command
order of "right." He knew, as we all do now, that principled and "right"
decisions may not necessarily be adhered to. There is Law and there is
Politics. Even these great forces have to negotiate with each other, as
Professor Levinson recognizes when he asks whether religious freedom and
equal rights for women must be included in Afghani or Iraqi new
constitutions. Whose Law? Whose Constitution? Whose Rights? And,
Whose Culture will mediate these issues?
The examination of these great constitutional issues and moments
sometimes obscures the importance of equally important everyday
interactions that involve the confrontation of equally held and valid different
"principles" or values--consider religious differences (as I know Professor
Levinson has), the "equal" rights of two separating parents to have custody
of their children, comparative or "equal" fault for an accident or wrong in
our multi-causal world of harm, or competing, but equally valid, claims to
the use of some property. In many such cases compromise is actually a
moral good, for it can allocate goods or rights in a more precise and
intermediate (not brittle or binary) way.20 Various forms of compromise can
actually more accurately reflect the just allocation of goods and rights. This
observation about legal rules and remedies (the need for less absolute and
binary solutions in many matters) is what has given birth to the modem
alternative dispute resolution movement in law 21 and also to more supple
and subtle legal doctrines, such as proportionality in constitutional
adjudication.22
In one sense, Justice Brandeis's famous argument (in a dissent23) to
encourage "laboratories of democracy" in different state experimentations
with regulation, is a recognition that not all legal or political issues should be
answered in the same or universal way. Whether as a defense of
"federalism" compromiseS24 (or different, not universal, legal solutions), or
ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING (2002).
19. 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also Stanley F. Reed. HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/
topics/stanley-f-reed.
20. John E. Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, in NOMos, supra note 1, at 190.
21. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOw, LELA LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & JEAN
STERNLIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2d ed. 2011).
22. AHARON BARACK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 254-59 (2006).
23. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
24. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2011).
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the newer form of decentralized "democratic experimentalism" 25 , the
recognition that governmental bodies, institutions or polities "negotiate"
with each other to try different solutions to common legal problems, is a
recognition that even in constitutional governance, there are variations, not
universals, in governance and legal decisions. "Principle" does not
necessarily point in only one direction.
And consider, in the context of the assessment of constitutional
compromises, that some polities have feared pursuing the constitutional
"principled" negotiation route completely. Where other values may be both
more important than political agreement or settlement (religion, faith,
preservation of resources and unity), some polities (e.g. Israel) have decided
to avoid the fissures that truly principled constitution making might cause in
the larger society. Even Great Britain which has more or less successfully
operated a very rich and deep common law system of "constitutional"
judicial decision making and basic human rights has thus far not engaged in
the process of "writing" down the text of those constitutional commitments.
An unwritten constitution provides that much more flexibility in
interpretation and legal evolution.27
And, in legal decision making and dispute resolution (where precedent
may not be required, desired, or achievable), appeals to religion, faith,
emotion (affective appeals), as well as to very contested principled reasons
which are (currently) irreconcilable (consider tax policy, gun control,
affirmative action, gay marriage, etc. issues), some forms of negotiated
processes or decision making might provide some alternative, variable and
more flexible solutions to be achieved at different levels (non-constitutional)
of action or regulation. I am not here suggesting that these hotly contested
issues like gun control, abortion, affirmative action, etc., do not or should
not have "constitutional" and "principled" solutions, just that some
intermediated and variable solutions, whether "temporary" or more
permanent, might be more productive to pursue, absent a clear constitutional
resolution. I have elaborated on how a form of three process (reason,
bargaining, and appeals to the affective) democratic deliberation might be
used in variable forms for different kinds of disputes and issues elsewhere.2 8
Thus, other forms of decision making, more akin to "compromise" or
25. Michael C. Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998).
26. Barak, supra note 22, at 20-35.
27. Recently there has been debate about whether Great Britain (or more controversially,
England, separate from other parts of the island nation) should enact its own constitution or "Bill of
Rights." This is part of an internal debate about the role of the European Union in regulating such
matters as human rights, and it produces political arguments about sovereignty that are not so
dissimilar as those which characterized our own formative years. See, e.g., VERNON BOGDANOR,
THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION (2009); DAWN OLIVER, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM (2003).
28. See Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s), supra note 12.
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contingently arrived at outcomes might actually have greater legitimacy and
moral defensibility than the blunt and sharp-edged non-compromised
"principled" outcome (in some matters).
Truly negotiated compromise may also have the advantage of consent
and agreement, whether explicit, or even perhaps implicit (as in those silent
negotiated "deals" or logrolls for votes by judges who sit on the same courts
over time). Compromise reached by agreement (if real and not coerced,
either by power or circumstance) is consent, and that is at least one form of
legitimate justification for outcomes reached in both political and personal
life. Thus, we could profitably examine, as historians now do, how real was
the consent that framed our constitution; how "free" are the justices of the
Supreme Court in tacitly or explicitly negotiating votes and opinion writing?
Are there (as Professor Levinson seems to agree in his comparative analysis
of Naim29 ("rotten") and Newdow 30 (not so rotten)) variations in the
justifications we can offer in the compromises reached at both institutional
and individual levels in constitutional (and other) decision making?
From the rigorous study of political and legal action and judicial
decision making as it actually unfolds in a variety of different locations,
constitutively creating new orders, iteratively implementing and engaging in
governance and law making, we should be able to see that it really is
virtually impossible to specify in advance when and how compromise is to
be assessed as "second best" to a preferred sense of "right" or "principle."
This notion of not always doing what is "principled" seems to offend at least
some of us, especially for those who, like Ronald Dworkin, think there is a
"right" answer to legal dilemmas, 3 but in my view, as Professor Levinson
has illuminated with some of his illustrations and examples of constitutional
compromises, the analysis and assessments of compromise in both
constitutional and other settings is deeply contextual and variegated. We
would do well to understand that we may need to make variable and relative,
not universal and uniform, our moral assessments of compromise. We need
human flexibility, negotiation, and compromise to live, indeed to flourish,
but we also do need to assess when and how to treat those with whom we
negotiate as our moral counterparts.32 Professor Levinson has joined a
group of scholars and decision makers who are interested in rigorously
exploring how we can see the variability and "relativity" in the
29. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
30. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
31. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 288 (1978).
32. See MARGALIT, supra note 1; Menkel-Meadow, Compromise, Negotiation, and Morality,
supra note 3.
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constitutional, legal, political, and personal choices we make. In my view,
the more deeply and contextually we explore those choices, the greater is the
likelihood our choices will be at least temporarily wise, at least until the
context changes and we have to revisit the compromises we have made.
914
